Shareholder activism in the UK: types of activists, forms of activism, and their impact on a target’s performance by Filatotchev, I. & Dotsenko, O.
Filatotchev, I. & Dotsenko, O. (2015). Shareholder activism in the UK: types of activists, forms of 
activism, and their impact on a target’s performance. Journal of Management & Governance, 
19(1), pp. 5-24. doi: 10.1007/s10997-013-9266-5 
City Research Online
Original citation: Filatotchev, I. & Dotsenko, O. (2015). Shareholder activism in the UK: types of 
activists, forms of activism, and their impact on a target’s performance. Journal of Management & 
Governance, 19(1), pp. 5-24. doi: 10.1007/s10997-013-9266-5 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/7918/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Shareholder Activism in the UK: Types of Activists, Forms of Activism, 
and Their Impact on a Target’s Performance  
 
 
Igor Filatotchev 
Sir John Cass Business School 
City University London 
106 Bunhill Row 
London EC1Y 8TZ 
Tel:   +44(0)20 7040 5278 
Fax:   +44(0)20 7040 8328 
Email: Igor.Filatotchev@city.ac.uk 
 
 
Oksana Dotsenko 
Ernest & Young Ltd 
Email: oksana.dotsenko@yahoo.com 
  2 
Shareholder Activism in the UK: Types of Activists, Forms of Activism, 
and Their Impact on a Target’s Performance 
Abstract 
Considering the recent rapid expansion of shareholder activism phenomenon in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the vast amount of resources committed to it by corporations, 
government and investors, its effectiveness has become a crucial subject for investigation.  
This article analyzes organizational outcomes of shareholder activism in the UK. This 
research is based on a unique comprehensive database of shareholder activism events during 
the period of 1998 – 2008. We provide a detailed account of different types of activists, 
activism strategies and shareholder demands associated with the events of activism. Our 
findings show that the effectiveness of shareholder activism in terms of abnormal stock-
market returns varies dramatically depending on its form, type of investor and the nature of 
investor proposals.  
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Introduction  
Shareholder activism has now become a broadly used investment strategy associated with the 
increasing willingness of investors to trigger corporate change and intervene in 
management’s decisions.  More proactive activist approach of traditional institutional 
shareholders and growing role of hedge funds and international investors facilitate and 
reshape the development of shareholder activism. Since 1986 the number of shareholder 
proposals filled in the US was constantly increasing, and in 2006 it hit the record high of 645 
shareholder proposals presented at the annual meetings (IRRC, 2006). In the UK, the list of 
companies challenged by activists recently included Vodafone, Sainsbury’s, HSBC, and 
Tesco signalling that the size of the firm is no longer a barrier to activism.  There is a 
continuing pressure from the government and investor associations to promote shareholder 
activism. For example, having introduced the 2006 Companies Act and a series of best 
practice recommendations, such as the Combined Code on Corporate Governance and the 
recently adopted Stewardship Code that targets institutional investors, the UK government 
provided shareholders with further capabilities to engage with companies in their investment 
portfolio. 
Bearing in mind substantial resources committed to shareholder activism by 
corporations and investors, its effectiveness has become an important subject for practitioners 
and academics.  Will the company value improve if activist shareholders make their voices 
heard in the boardroom?  The answer to this question is very important not only to the 
company’s long term investors but also to a wider body of stakeholders including employees 
and the regulator.  
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Despite of the increasing importance of shareholder activism, many prior studies 
suggests that it has minimal or zero impact on the company’s share performance (Gillan and 
Starks, 2007; Karpoff, 2001).  However, a vast majority of studies have explored only the 
governance effects of a single form of shareholder activism (for example, shareholder 
proposals or private negotiations). In addition, most of the previous studies have focused on 
companies and investors in the US.  Institutional and legal environments may also have a 
significant impact on investor activism outcomes, and studying the effects of shareholder 
activism outside the US may enrich our understanding of this phenomenon (Filatotchev, 
Jackson and Nakajima, 2013).  
This paper provides a detailed analysis of investor activism in the UK by looking at 
types of active investors, their demands and outcomes of the events associated with investor 
activism in terms of the short and medium term stock-market responses. It makes several 
major contributions to the literature. First, it provides a longitudinal evidence on shareholder 
activism in the UK using data for the period of 1998 – 2008. Second, we differentiate 
between two forms of activism: shareholder proposals and public announcements and 
campaigns. Although public campaigns have generated a widespread interest, there is very 
little evidence on their drivers or outcomes, and this study examines this form of activism 
separately and in comparison with shareholder proposals. Third, we extend previous studies 
by differentiating among different types of activist investors, as well as different forms of 
their demands. These differences between various forms and aspects of activism in terms of 
their effects on the target company imply that activist investors may have to reassess their 
agenda of engagement with the investee companies and use their resources more effectively 
focusing on the value creating forms of activism. Although this study investigates the effects 
on investor activism in the UK, our findings may have important policy implications for other 
countries, such as the US, where the level of investor activism is particularly high.    
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Theoretical background  
A growing number of studies in economics, business strategy and corporate finance research 
are focused on the governance roles of large-block holders in general, and institutional 
investors in particular, in large, publicly traded firms (see Cunat,  Gine and Guadalupe, 2012; 
Ramadorai, 2010, for recent reviews). This research suggests that large-block outside 
ownership may be an effective counter-balance to managerial opportunism. Companies may 
have active shareholders that play a critical leadership and monitoring role. They have both the 
incentives and the means to restrain self-serving behaviour of managers (Maug 1998; 
Zeckhauser and Pound 1990). Hoskisson et al. (2002) and Tihaniy et al. (2003) provide an 
extensive survey of literature which suggests that institutional investors with significant 
ownership positions have both the incentives to monitor executives and the influence to bring 
about change they feel will be beneficial. These investors use their power through the increased 
shareholder activism, because this strategy is a preferable modus operandi for large 
shareholders bearing in mind the size of their major stakes in corporations. The barriers to these 
investors’ divestments of their holdings are high, and they have few options for alternative 
(large) investments (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996).  
Because activist investors have both the incentive and influence to engage in 
shareholder activism that makes sure that managers and directors operate in the interests of 
shareholders, their presence among the firm’s investors provides an important driver of ‘good’ 
corporate governance that should lead to efficiency gains and improvement in performance 
(Daily et al. 2003; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Strategic management provides another 
important stream of research that links investor activism with the firm’s strategic decisions. For 
example, using structural equation modelling, Hoskisson et al. (1994) show that large block 
shareholders help mitigate against poor strategy, such as diversification, to evolve into poor 
performance, therefore decreasing the magnitude of restructuring. Hill and Snell (1988) find 
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that institutional ownership is positively correlated with R&D expenditures, specialization and 
relatedness in a sample of 94 firms in research-intensive industries.  
A number of recent studies have moved from traditional empirical analysis of links 
between ownership structure and types of owners to more qualitative, multi-disciplinary 
research on actual actions of owners in terms of their involvement in corporate governance. For 
example, Anson, White and Ho (2004) and Daily et al. (2003) discuss corporate governance 
practices of large public pension funds such as CalPERS and TIAA-CREF in the USA.  
CalPERS, for example, has been active in seeking greater board independence by requesting 
that firms in which the fund invests (1) compose their boards predominantly of independent 
directors, (2) identify a lead director to assist the board chair, and (3) impose age limits on 
directors (Nesbitt, 1994). Similarly, TIAA-CREF was very critical of firms that maintain what 
the fund views as inappropriate corporate governance structures. Sundaramurthy and Lewis 
(2003) provide evidence which suggests that by publicly criticizing board oversight and 
confronting complacent management institutional investors destabilize managerial power and 
pressure strategic changes in line with shareholder demands. Black (1992) notes that 
institutional investors have the motivation to discourage conglomerate acquisitions that may 
dilute managerial attention and depress firm value. Aguilera (2005) indicates that companies in 
the UK and USA are under pressure from institutional investors to appoint a lead (senior) 
independent director whose responsibility is to serve as a communication channel between 
shareholders and the board.  
Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) suggest that investor activists also act as an agent or 
catalyst for certain types of change.  For example, they may alter the balance of power by 
influencing board and management turnover enabling an efficient succession (Denis and Sarin 
1999). Wahal (1996) suggests that target firms are increasingly adopting proxy proposals 
regarding changes in corporate governance. Activist investors may initiate revisions in 
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executive compensation (Denis et al. 1997) and in directors’ term of office (Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis 2003).  
Finally, the legal perspective on corporate governance suggests further that to be 
effective, institutional investors should have a right to sue directors and auditors for negligence 
and breach of duty (Filatotchev et al., 2013; Bethel and Gillan, 2002).  In the past, the company 
itself primarily initiated legal actions against directors.  Legal scholars suggest that 
shareholders should have a statutory right to bring an action enforcing the company’s rights 
against directors through so-called derivative claims (Bebchuk, 1994; 2007). Some researchers 
document that the increase in shareholder activism has been accompanied by an increase in 
shareholder lawsuits (Kesner and Johnson 1990). Langevoort (2001) suggests that the very 
threat of lawsuits may provide a powerful governance effect associated with large-block 
shareholders. Bebchuk (1999) indicates, however, that only a small fraction of public 
companies in the USA faced contested board elections that were designed to oust existing 
directors. One of the barriers to contested board elections is associated with financial and 
organisational difficulties shareholders face when trying to place their own directors on a 
company’s proxy statement.  
Despite the development of shareholder activism and generally positive assessment of 
its governance roles by researchers, the majority of empirical studies focused on actual actions 
of shareholders indicate that activism has little or no effect on targeted firms (Filatotchev et al., 
2007). Jensen (1993) has questioned the promise of shareholder activism in general, and 
institutional investor activism in particular. Their increasing reliance on indexing investment 
strategies suggests that they believe that, on average, their portfolio of firms will yield returns 
comparable to those for the market as a whole, regardless of the governance structure of their 
portfolio firms.  Black (1992) documents an increasing importance of “exit” strategies for the 
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fund managers as opposed to shareholder activism. Daily et al. (2003) also suggest that 
shareholder activism can be much more costly than pure reliance on indexing strategies.  
A vast majority of empirical studies that focus on submitted shareholder proposals do 
not found any significant abnormal returns around the date of information release (Carleton, 
Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling, 
1996; Prevost and Rao, 2000; Smith, 1996). Karpoff et al. (1996) argues that in the US most 
efforts of the activists seek governance changes and have negligible effects on the target 
company’s operations or efficiency. Some studies, however, identify significant responses by 
looking at other types of activism events.  For example, Gillan and Starks (2000) find 
negative abnormal returns for proposals to rescind poison pills, while Del Guercio and 
Hawkins (1999) report negative abnormal returns for board-related and anti-takeover 
proposals. Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) suggest that market response is negative 
for proposals related to board diversity.  Strickland, Wiles and Zenner (1996) in their study of 
negotiated settlements with the target company find that this kind of activism is associated 
with significantly positive returns. Gillan (1995), Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) and 
Wahal (1996) found no evidence of significant effects on stock performance of the 
companies that experienced targeting for the first time.  Prevost and Rao (2000) report 
significantly negative short term stock returns for companies targeted by CalPERS and other 
public pension funds.   A vast majority of studies of long-term operating performance have 
reported no statistically significant changes in targeted companies (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 
1999; Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling, 1996; Smith, 1996; Strickland, Wiles and Zenner, 
1996; Wahal, 1996).  
Bearing in mind these empirical and theoretical arguments against shareholder activism 
hypotheses, a growing number of studies point out that the answer may be in the types of 
investors and what they actually do in terms of engaging with firms in which they invest. Most 
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research on performance effects of large-block share ownership has not differentiated among 
types of investors.  Only recently have studies acknowledged that the identity of such owners 
has important organisational implications because different owners may have different 
objectives and decision-making horizons (Hoskisson et al. 2002; Siegel, Wright and 
Filatotchev, 2011; Tihanyi et al. 2003). Some authors (e.g., Brickeley et al., 1988; David, 
Kochhar and Levitas, 1998) differentiate between “pressure-resistant”, “pressure-sensitive” and 
“pressure-indeterminate” institutional investors. Pressure-resistant institutions, such as public 
pension funds, mutual funds, foundations and endowments, are unlikely to have strong business 
links with their investors, and they may have stronger influence on strategy choices and their 
performance outcomes (Hoskisson et al., 2002).  Johnson and Greening (1999) also indicate 
that pension and investment fund managers’ objective is a high relative performance of their 
portfolio firms because of their own reward system. On the other hand, “pressure-sensitive” 
investors such as insurance companies are likely to have business relationships with the firms 
in which they invest (Kochar and David, 1996). Because they often have an obligation to 
support the management’s agenda, their governance role tends to be more passive compared to 
“activist” investors (Tihaniy et al. 2003). Corporate pension funds typify the pressure 
indeterminate institutional investor category. Relationship between the funds and the firms in 
which they invest may exist, and they are unlikely to actively challenge firm decision makers 
(Dalton et al. 2003).  
 Daily et al. (2003) and other authors suggest that only pressure-resistant investors 
behave in line with the assumptions of agency arguments related to the governance roles of 
activist investors. Georgen, Renneboog and Zhang (2008) and Faccio and Lasfer (2000) argued 
that some institutional investors may not intervene with their portfolio companies because of 
lack of monitoring expertise and the desire to maintain the liquidity of their investments as 
insider trading regulation prevents them from rebalancing their portfolios. Hendry and 
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Sanderson (2004) analyze a number of institutions including wholesale and retail asset 
management companies, pension funds and the investment arms of life assurance companies in 
the UK.  The authors split their sample into ‘active’ and ‘passive’ investors according to their 
approach to engagement.  Active investors were mainly fund management arms of global 
investment banks,  whereas fund management arms of large life insurance companies and large 
self-managed pension funds were classified as passive.   
Among “pressure-resistant” investors, hedge funds have gained a prominent role in 
the context of investor activism. Their strategy, however, is argued to differ from activism by 
traditional institutional investors. It is usually aimed at significant changes in specific 
companies, in contrast with institutional investors whose activities are often directed at 
changes in corporate governance rules related to a group of portfolio companies (Kahan and 
Rock, 2007).  Several studies investigate recent trends of investor activism by hedge funds.  
Their results indicate that there are short-term gains associated with hedge fund activism.  For 
example, Klein and Zur (2006) and Brav, Jiang, Portnoy and Thomas (2006) in their studies 
of 13D filings by hedge funds report substantial abnormal returns.  Clifford (2007) suggests 
that firms that are targeted by hedge funds experience an improvement in operating 
performance and earn larger excess returns than a control group.  
Finally, the vast majority of studies of investor activism reviewed in this section are 
focused on the US whereas the UK practices are relatively under-researched. Becht et al. 
(2009) study private engagements with target companies by one activist shareholder, Hermes 
UK Focus Fund.  They report that the fund frequently seeks significant changes in the 
company’s strategy by predominantly conducting ‘behind the scene’ interventions.  Using the 
event study methodology these authors find positive short term abnormal returns on the 
announcement of various corporate changes that were associated with this type of 
engagement. However, news about fund accumulating a 3% stake in the firms are followed 
  11 
by a negative market response. Obviously, this research is based on a single case study and its 
results cannot be generalised to other shareholder activists. Moreover, it tests the 
effectiveness of shareholder activism in the form of private engagements, and it is not clear 
how the market would respond to publicly announced events of activism. In another study 
Buchanan and Yang (2007) conduct a comparative analysis of shareholder proposals in the 
US and UK for the period of 2000-2006.  This study does not find any statistically significant 
results for the UK companies and attribute this to a small size of the UK sample.  Again, this 
paper considers only shareholder proposals without discussing other forms of activism.   
McColgan (2001) and Filatotchev et al (2013) argue that a country’s legal system is a 
fundamental determinant of how its governance system evolves.  While both the US and UK 
have the same ‘common law’ legal tradition, and equity ownership is largely diffused in both 
countries, the UK investment landscape has a number of legal and institutional differences 
that may have an impact on the effectiveness of shareholder activism as a governance factor. 
It can be argued that the UK has more favourable conditions for shareholder activism because 
of its legal system with fewer limitations on actions of shareholders. For example, the US 
shareholders cannot call special meetings, unless the company’s corporate charter or bylaws 
allow otherwise. In the UK, shareholders with 10% of voting rights may force the company 
to hold an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM). Furthermore, corporate articles of 
association cannot deprive shareholders of this right (Becht et al., 2009). In the US, 
shareholders have to carry out a contested solicitation and bear all costs themselves if they 
want to put forward their board nominees (Cai, Garner, and Walking, 2006). This process 
usually has low success rates and it is not very popular among investors (Buchanan and 
Yang, 2007).  In contrast, the UK shareholders can replace the board with their own 
nominees if they managed to win more than half of eligible votes and each director received 
the majority of votes. Another very significant difference is that in the UK shareholder 
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proposals, once passed, are legally binding, whereas in the US they are non-binding and 
similar to recommendations. Therefore, rules concerning shareholder meetings, directors’ 
removal and election, and the binding power of shareholder proposals create a more 
favourable environment for shareholder activism in the UK.  
Thus, this paper explores gaps that exist in current research by looking at actual 
actions of different types of investors and their demands in the UK. Our review of the 
existing literature suggests mixed evidence with regard to the effectiveness of shareholder 
activism as a governance mechanism. There is a need to conduct a more fine-grained research 
in this field. Being a first exploratory study of this nature, this paper does not suggest specific 
research hypotheses. Instead, we address the following general research questions:  
 How does the stock-market respond to shareholder activism events initiated by 
different types of investors? 
 Are there any differences between performance outcomes of different channels of 
shareholder activism, such as shareholder proposals and public debates? 
 Are differences between investor demands associated with different performance 
outcomes?  
Data and Methodology  
We collected data on shareholder activism events from 1998 to 2008 by using a number of 
sources. First, we used Factiva database that provides comprehensive information on 
corporate events. The primary set of information was collected by searching for all 
shareholder activism events using combination of words: shareholder(s)/investor(s) activism, 
activist shareholder(s)/investor(s), shareholder(s)/investor(s) revolt, rebel 
shareholder(s)/investor(s). In addition, we used a list of registered shareholder proposals from 
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1998 to 2008 provided by Research, Recommendations and Electronic Voting, a corporate 
governance advisory service which is part of Risk Metrics Group. This sampling procedure 
provided information on 270 shareholder activism events targeting 217 firms. In order to be 
included into our sample, information about an event should have been available to the public 
through a company’s press release or announcement, investor press release or announcement, 
an interview with the company’s or investor’s representative, and/or an article in a media 
source containing description of the event.    
Next, we manually collected data on the timeframe of the event, details about investor 
demands, and types of activism. When a series of events was initiated by the same active 
investor in relation to the same demand, only the first event was included in our sample 
provided that the time lag between the first and the second event was less than 6 months. 
Because of missing data problems, our final sample included information on 101 shareholder 
activism events. For each company we were able to identify an exact date of the event, 
shareholder demand(s) and the type of activist investor. There was no significant difference 
between missing companies and companies included in our sample in terms of size, 
performance and other firm-level characteristics. Daily share price information surrounding 
the event was collected for each event using Reuters and Datastream. 
In order to analyse the short term and medium term impact of activism on the target 
firm’s value, the event study methodology was used. This approach measures the impact of a 
specific event on the firms’ value using financial market data and examining changes in stock 
prices around the date of the announcement (MacKinley, 1997). The Market-Adjusted Return 
Model was used for the calculation of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), and the FTSE- 
All Share Index was used for the adjustment.   
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Results 
To evaluate the dynamics of shareholder activism in the UK we started with information on 
270 shareholder activism events targeting 217 firms. Various forms of activism were 
classified into four categories: (a) public debate (e.g., briefings to journalists, press releases, 
open letters or circulars ahead of general meeting, organising action groups, etc); (b) 
submitting shareholder proposal(s) to an annual general meeting; (c) calling for and 
submitting shareholder proposal(s) to an extraordinary general meeting; and (d) litigation 
actions. Table 1 provides a distribution of shareholder activism events over time and the 
tactics (forms of activism) that were used by investors.  This table shows that in 56% of all 
cases, shareholders tried to publicly express their concerns rather than directly use their legal 
rights in order to influence the company’s management. This indicates that investors in the 
UK consider public debate as an effective tool of activism.  In 43% of cases investor 
campaigns resulted in proposals to the company’s general meeting.  In total, 117 events led to 
the submission of shareholder proposal(s) and the majority of them were presented at an 
extraordinary shareholder meeting.  In general, the sample reflects an increasing trend in the 
number of shareholder activism events over time, especially a sharp rise in 2007. Activist 
investors, as a rule, did not act alone, with 64% of events involving several shareholders 
acting together and forming pacts with combined voting power.  Moreover, institutions in the 
UK often acted collectively through their professional associations such as the National 
Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) and the Association of British Insurers (ABI). 
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- Table 1 near here- 
Bearing in mind a diverse nature of activist investors in the UK, they were classified 
into seven categories: traditional institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance 
companies (II), their associations (AI), investment management companies, including asset 
management companies, investment and unit trusts and funds, investment holding groups 
(IM), associated companies that have business interests in the target firms (CO), hedge funds 
(HF), private investors (PI) and other investors such as unions, human-rights groups, and 
environmental groups.  
Our analysis shows that traditional institutional investors and their associations 
continue to play an important role being responsible for almost one third of the total events.  
A slight decline of this group’s activities in 2005 can be explained by a substantial 
reallocation of equity ownership in the UK and by an increasing proportion of privately 
negotiated settlements between organisations and their traditional institutional investors. 
Other types of investors such as investment managers and hedge funds appear to be 
increasingly active. In particular, hedge funds initiated a substantial amount of interventions 
peaking in 2007.  There is evidence of a growing number of events initiated by foreign 
investors, usually the hedge funds.  This can be a reflection of a general trend in the 
ownership structure in the UK that is associated with the growing proportion of equity held 
by alternative fund managers and investors from the rest of the world, in particular from the 
US. Private shareholders accounted for 24% of activist campaigns. Within this group, 30% of 
events were led by former executives (often founders or former CEOs) of the company and 
private shareholder associations or action groups. Finally, only few activist events were 
organised or led by social or environmental groups in the UK, possibly because they do not 
have enough influence and cannot meet high ownership requirements and bear all the costs of 
activism. 
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In terms of various types of investor activism, Table 2 shows that traditional investors 
and their associations seem to rely mostly on different forms of public debates (e.g., press 
releases, media events, etc). However, this table also shows that hedge funds, investment 
managers and private investors usually use a variety of tactics in order to achieve their goals. 
In more than 50% of all cases these types of investors used shareholder proposals put forward 
at AGMs or EGMs. Private investors are also leading in terms of using legal procedures 
against the company, but the total number of cases remains relatively small at 2%. It seems 
that the US-style “litigation culture” is not popular among the UK investors, but there are 
some signs that legal actions taken by investors may become more popular in the following 
years. 
- Table 2 near here-  
All shareholder demands were classified into six broad categories: general governance-
related demands (such as board size, proportion of non-executive directors or composition of 
Board committees); board member-related demands, when investors name specific directors 
they intend to elect or remove; remuneration demands (e.g., the size of remuneration 
packages and severance payments of top executives, notice period and other contract terms); 
demands regarding the firm’s capital structure (share buyback, dividend programs and capital 
restructuring plans); business strategy demands mostly related to corporate divestments, 
mergers and acquisitions, etc.; and social and environmental demands such as adopting social 
and environmental standards, workplace policies. Our data shows that board member-related 
demands appear most frequently (35%), followed by remuneration (22%), business strategy 
(21%), governance (10%), capital structure (9%) and social and environmental (3%) 
demands.  
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The board member or business strategy related demands appear to be the main drivers 
behind the increase in the number of shareholder activism events. In the US, demands related 
to the board of directors usually focus on declassifying the board or separating positions of 
the CEO and Chairman (Buchanan and Yang, 2007). In the UK, 35% of the board-related 
demands target a replacement of the entire board, or a proxy contest event. A proxy contest is 
often defined as a process in which outside dissident shareholders mount active solicitations 
aimed at gaining board control (Gordon and Pound, 1993). Since shareholder proposals in the 
UK are legally binding, shareholders in the UK have more favourable conditions to nominate 
and elect directors.  Our data suggests that the UK investors use removal or election of a 
board member or a proxy contest more proactively as an effective mechanism to initiate 
corporate changes. 
A sharp rise of remuneration-related cases in 2003 may be linked to corporate 
governance debates around a ‘reward for failure’ and new legislation requiring boards to 
submit remuneration reports to an AGM.  Another type of demands that is used relatively 
more frequently in the UK is related to business strategy.  Investors often target firms’ 
operations or strategic decisions, for example, urging the board to consider selling off 
company assets or the company itself, opposing an acquisition or a bid from another 
company.  The frequency of this type of interventions has risen significantly in 2007. It 
seems that worsening economic conditions force investors to intervene with the firm’s 
strategic decisions more often, making firms rethink their business models or future direction 
in the times of economic downturn. Demands concerning various ‘poison pill’ mechanisms 
are mainly absent in the UK, as UK companies do not usually use these anti-takeover 
defences due to the resistance from institutional shareholders (Black and Coffee, 1994). 
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Using the event study methodology, we tested the stock-market response to various 
events of shareholder activism. We started our analysis with looking at the market reaction to 
the announcements of activism events for the total sample including all types of investors and 
all forms of activism. Pre-event performance results were negative and statistically significant 
(p=0.08) which indicates that activist tend to target underperforming companies. Our tests 
provided some evidence of positive abnormal returns using the short term time frame and 
negative cumulative returns in the medium term period. However, both results lacked 
statistical significance indicating that investor activism as a whole has no influence on the 
target company’s market value. A conflicting reaction of the market to the different types of 
investors and activism events can potentially drive these results, and our subsequent tests 
explore this issue in detail. 
 First, we explored the short and medium term effects of shareholder activism events 
depending on tactics that were used by shareholders. Our sample was divided into two major 
groups of firms experiencing activism events: public debate and submitting shareholder 
proposals to the firms’ general meeting. Panel A of Table 3 shows statistically significant 
positive short term effects (3.3% and 3.5%  CAR for five days surrounding an event and 
twenty day period of post-event performance) related to shareholder proposals. These short 
term abnormal returns reflect an expected value of activism based on market estimation of the 
likelihood that investor plans will be implemented.   
- Table 3 near here-  
These results differ from previous research on shareholder activism in the US which 
failed to find any significant market response. One explanation of this finding is related to a 
legally binding nature of shareholder proposals in the UK. When a proposal has been 
accepted by an AGM/EGM, it has to be implemented by the company’s management. Figure 
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1 shows that investors respond positively to this information, and abnormal returns grow 
steadily after information has been released.   
- Figure 1 near here-  
Panel B in Table 3 reports the stock price reactions to investors initiating a public 
debate in order to put pressure on the target company’s management. Pre-event negative 
returns (-2.46%) signal that public campaigns usually targeted at underperforming firms. We 
did not find statistically significant abnormal return in the short term window after an 
announcement. However, there is evidence of a negative long-term, post-event performance 
(-3.7%). This implies that public campaigns initiated by investors do not work effectively to 
improve company’s value. On the contrary, investors seem to consider such news as a sign of 
shareholders’ failure to come to a negotiated agreement with the firm’s directors and an 
indication of deep-rooted problems that may affect performance in the long term.  
Second, we looked at stock-market responses to different types of investor demands. 
Table 4 shows that demands related to the company’s directors and business strategy generate 
positive short term reaction of the firm’s share price (4.2% and 5.9% for a five-day event 
window for board members and strategy demands in Panels A and B respectively). However, 
there is no significant market response to investor demands associated with executive 
remuneration (Panel C in Table 4). 
- Table 4 near here- 
Our findings indicate that the market perceives board changes as an effective tool to 
facilitate the company’s restructuring. Indeed, our data shows that in the majority of cases 
this type of investor demand involved a nomination of investor representatives on the board. 
Figure 2 clearly shows that the stock market participants positively respond to board-related 
demands long after these proposals have been put forward by shareholders. Strategy demands 
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are usually related to business issues where changes could be directly and relatively rapidly 
reflected in the company’s results (for example, a spin-off or divestiture). The medium term 
results, however, lack statistical significance.     
- Figure 2 near here- 
Third, we looked at stock-market responses to activist events depending on the type of 
activist investor. Panel A in Table 5 shows that traditional institutional investors usually 
target underperforming companies. However, the short term (five days surrounding the event) 
and medium term (from day three to six month after the event) abnormal returns are negative 
and statistically significant. Panel B provides similar results for associations of institutional 
investors. All events in these sub-samples were carried out through public debate, and our 
result can be a reflection of the market’s pessimistic view on such publicity, in line with our 
findings in Table 3. Moreover, traditional institutional investors rarely publicly put forward 
demands regarding specific aspects of a company’s business or management (such as share 
buy-backs, spin-offs, or nominations to the board of directors). More often they prefer 
indirect methods of influence such as face-to-face discussions with the company’s 
management. A combination of this specific form of activism and limited demands seems to 
lead to a negative stock reaction.  
- Table 5 near here- 
In contrast to traditional institutions, the hedge fund-initiated campaigns result in a 
statistically significant positive response (3.0% in a five-day event window, Panel C in Table 
5). This reaction can be explained by the specific tactics hedge funds use and their more 
aggressive demands which fuel the stock market expectations about possible corporate 
change. This finding is consistent with previous research in the US (Brav et al., 2006). 
However, as Figure 3 clearly shows, in the medium term the positive abnormal returns appear 
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to be diminishing. It seems that hedge funds in the UK are less successful in achieving their 
goals and create less value than it was initially expected by the stock market. Also, as it was 
mentioned before, many of the activist hedge funds are based in US and have great 
experience in their domestic market, but facing difficulties in realising their strategies in the 
UK.  We did not find any significant effects of shareholder activism initiated by fund 
managers. 
- Figure 3 near here- 
Discussion  
Our research shows that shareholder activism in the UK is increasing in its economic 
importance following recent changes in legislation and capital market structure. Taking this 
into account and bearing in mind substantial resources committed to shareholder activism by 
corporations and investors, its effectiveness has become an important area for investigation.   
Although our analysis did not identify any significant impact of shareholder activism 
in general on the target firm’s performance, a deeper look into the impacts of different types 
and forms of activism has provided some interesting patterns. Our paper confirms that 
shareholder activism can create a positive impact; however, its effects on the company’s 
value vary dramatically depending on its form and the nature of investor demands. 
Our analysis clearly indicates that the stock market participants take into account a 
specific form of shareholder activism. The UK legislation improves the effectiveness of 
shareholder activism in the form of shareholder proposals.  In particular, proposals that have 
been approved by shareholders’ vote have a binding power and have to be implemented by 
management. In addition, the UK shareholders are empowered by their ability to nominate 
corporate directors and to call an EGM. In the majority of proposals, active investors 
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demanded a replacement of a specific member of the company’s board of directors with their 
nominee or specific changes to the company’s business strategy. These demands are seen as 
more ‘aggressive’ or ‘effective’ in terms of facilitating corporate restructuring and change. 
Therefore, they are likely to have a significant impact on the company’s performance, and 
our analysis confirms these arguments. 
In contrast to proposal submission, investor activism in the form of public debate is 
different in its nature and does not have binding powers or mechanisms to ensure its 
implementation. As a result, the stock market does not expect this type of change to be 
implemented or to improve the company’s performance.  We did not find any statistically 
significant impact of this form of shareholder activism on the target company’s market value 
in the short and long term, meaning that this form of activism is not the most efficient way of 
spending resources allocated to shareholder engagement with companies.    
Our analysis of the effectiveness of shareholder activism depending on types of 
demand shows that more aggressive shareholder demands associated with a likelihood of 
corporate change lead to an increase in the company’s value. More specifically, board 
member- and business strategy-related demands are associated with positive abnormal 
returns. Demands concerning remuneration issues do not show any significant impact to the 
firms’ market values. Again, these findings call for a more fine-grained research on the 
economic impact of shareholder activism. 
Our evidence also indicates that investors’ mechanisms of engagement with 
companies vary depending on their type, in line with previous research on the governance 
roles of different types of investors (Hoskisson et al., 2002). This could be explained by the 
differences in their investment horizons, motivations, strategies and goals that have been 
identified by previous research. This paper’s results show that the stock price reaction to 
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activism may be a complex outcome of a combination of tactics and demands that investors 
use, rather than their types.  For example, our results show that traditional institutional 
investors (pension funds and investment arms of insurance companies) rarely use options that 
are provide by the UK law, such as submitting a proposal or calling an EGM. They seem to 
prefer public debates in order to trigger corporate change. Further, their demands are usually 
aimed at the firms’ governance issues (for example, board independence or size) or 
remuneration issues.  This is a less aggressive way to initiate corporate change and it does not 
seem to have a direct impact on the company’s operations.  As a result, this combination of a 
specific form of shareholder activism and demands has a negative impact on the target 
company’s market value. Compared to traditional investors, hedge funds’ activism associated 
with more direct demands and submission of shareholder proposals leads to a positive market 
reaction. Our evidence seems to suggest that only shareholder activism in certain forms 
(shareholder proposal), certain demands (board members and strategy) and by certain types 
of investors (hedge funds) leads to an increase of the target company’s market value.   
Previous research related to the effectiveness of shareholder activism has been 
focused on the US corporate environment, and, in the majority of cases, it failed to find any 
significant impacts of shareholder activism on the target firm’s performance. Our research 
clearly indicates that corporate governance mechanisms, in particular shareholder activism, 
do not work in the same way in every country and they may have different levels of 
efficiency in reducing agency cost depending on the legal and governance environments in a 
particular country (Filatotchev et al., 2013).  The UK experience shows that shareholder 
activism can be an effective governance mechanism, but its effects are not homogenous and 
vary dramatically depending on particular combinations of types of investors, their forms of 
engagement and specific demand. These findings suggest a need to re-think the current 
theoretical approach to the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. 
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In terms of practical implications, given the amount of time and resources that are 
being dedicated to investor activism issues, our findings may be of interest for both investors 
and the government. Shareholders and companies should develop a more informed approach 
to shareholder activism in order to avoid value-destroying activities and enhance its positive 
effects. More specifically, traditional institutional investors and investment managers, while 
developing their engagement policies, should carefully consider demands and tactics that they 
are going to use to achieve expected outcomes in order to avoid a decline in the target 
company’s value. More specifically, demands related remuneration or general governance 
issues should not be combined with public debate tactic but pursued in alternative forms. The 
periodic reviews and evaluations of the effectiveness of the investors’ involvement with the 
investee firms should be carried out.  
This research reveals that the current trends in the UK capital markets, e.g. a relative 
reduction of equity held by traditional institutional investors and a growing importance of 
hedge funds and foreign investors, may change patterns of shareholder activism.  Hence, its 
efficiency and impacts on performance may change in the future. Therefore, this research 
should be updated in order to be able to capture and track these changes.  
Limitations 
Our study has limitations that may be addressed in future research. First, our analysis is 
focused on publicly disclosed events of shareholder activism. However, in many cases,  
shareholders try to negotiate their demands with the target firm’s management informally or 
behind the closed doors. Such activities are not explored in this study, which can lead to an 
underestimation of the true extent of shareholder activism in the UK. Second, the accuracy of 
results based on the event study methodology is extremely sensitive to exact dates of events 
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and presence of other information releases surrounding these dates. Thus, the abnormal 
returns may reflect information other than that related to the event. Another limitation of this 
study is a difficulty with establishing a causal link between shareholder activism and 
subsequent medium and long term changes in corporate performance. The observed changes 
could be a result of public pressure, behind-the-scenes negotiations with activists, or some 
other influences outside investor activism cases considered in this study. Finally, the effects 
of dividend payments on share price were not captured in this study. Therefore, it is possible 
that changes in the firm’s value an activist event are underestimated. 
Conclusion 
This paper gives a detailed analysis of the development of investor activism in the UK during 
the last ten years by looking at types of active investors, their demands and outcomes of the 
events. It reveals that shareholder activism phenomenon is becoming more dominant in 
recent years and that current structural changes in the UK capital market lead to its 
transformation. The results display noticeable differences in activism by different types of 
investors, and they call for a more fine-grained and contextualized analysis of this important 
corporate governance factor. 
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Figure 1 Cumulative abnormal returns for shareholder proposals (a 40 days event window).  
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Figure 2 Cumulative abnormal returns for events related to board changes (a 40 days event 
window).  
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Figure 3 Cumulative abnormal returns for hedge funds’ activism events (a 40 days event 
window).  
 
  34 
 
Table 1. Frequency distribution and forms of shareholder activism events in the UK  
Form/ Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 H1 2008 
Grand 
Total Overall 
Public 
Debate 
5 10 7 8 15 19 16 21 10 26 13 150 56% 
Proposal, 
EGM 
2 1 8 6 10 6 7 14 10 13 12 89 33% 
Proposal, 
AGM 
3 1 2 7 2 2 2 - 5 2 2 28 10% 
Litigation  - - - - - 1 1 - - 1 - 3 1% 
Grand Total 10 12 17 21 27 28 26 35 25 42 27 270 100% 
 
  35 
 
Table 2 Shareholder activism events: types of shareholders and forms of activism  
Tactic/ 
Investor AI CO HF II IM Other PI 
Grand 
Total 
Public Debate 100% 57% 39% 98% 46% 13% 37% 56% 
Proposal, EGM - 43% 54% 2% 38% 13% 49% 33% 
Proposal, AGM -  -  7% -  14% 75% 13% 10% 
Litigation  -  -  -  -  1% -  2% 1% 
Grand Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Table 3.  Short and medium term cumulative abnormal returns, the two types of activism 
Panel A: Shareholder proposals 
Event window [days] N Mean Median t stat p value % positive 
CAR [-10;-3] 29 0.74% 0.54% 0.326 0.374 51.7% 
CAR [-2;+2] 29 3.29% 1.17% 1.602 0.060 67.9% 
CAR [+3;+20] 29 3.45% 1.50% 1.801 0.041 58.6% 
CAR [+3;+130] 28 0.98% 8.49% 0.157 0.438 57.1% 
Panel B: Public debate 
Event window [days] N Mean Median t stat p value % positive 
CAR [-10;-3] 67 -2.46% -0.78% -2.069 0.021 38.8% 
CAR [-2;+2] 67 -0.31% -0.04% -0.477 0.317 51.6% 
CAR [+3;+20] 67 -1.00% -1.47% -1.049 0.149 44.8% 
CAR [+3;+130] 64 -3.69% -4.23% -1.466 0.074 40.6% 
Note: The total count of the events in the table does not sum up to 101 because only events with 
single demand were taken into account. 
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Table 4 Short and medium term cumulative abnormal returns, different investor demands. 
Panel A: Board members related 
Event window [days] N Mean Median t stat p value % positive 
CAR [-10;-3] 18 1.25% 1.17% 0.491 0.315 55.6% 
CAR [-2;+2] 18 4.27% 1.20% 1.638 0.060 70.6% 
CAR [+3;+20] 18 0.55% -1.49% 0.258 0.400 44.4% 
CAR [+3;+130] 17 -8.28% -4.83% -0.888 0.194 35.3% 
Panel B: Business strategy related 
Event window [days] N Mean Median t stat p value % positive 
CAR [-10;-3] 10 -0.21% -1.35% -0.068 0.474 40.0% 
CAR [-2;+2] 10 5.94% 2.27% 1.874 0.047 77.8% 
CAR [+3;+20] 10 1.56% 2.93% 0.740 0.239 70.0% 
CAR [+3;+130] 9 -10.97% -1.03% -1.620 0.172 33.3% 
Panel C: Remuneration related 
Event window [days] N Mean Median t stat p value % positive 
CAR [-10;-3] 35 -0.78% -0.28% -0.551 0.293 45.7% 
CAR [-2;+2] 35 0.10% -0.04% 0.137 0.446 50.0% 
CAR [+3;+20] 35 0.47% -0.64% 0.371 0.356 48.6% 
CAR [+3;+130] 34 -2.95% -6.22% -0.836 0.205 35.3% 
Note: The total count of the events in the table does not sum up to 101 because only events with 
single demand were taken into account. 
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Table 5 Short and medium term cumulative abnormal returns, different types of investors 
Panel A: Traditional institutional investors 
Event window [days] N Mean Median t stat p value % positive 
CAR [-10;-3] 25 -2.39% -0.28% -1.475 0.077 48.0% 
CAR [-2;+2] 25 -2.01% -0.27% -1.883 0.036 36.0% 
CAR [+3;+20] 25 -0.94% -1.52% -0.572 0.286 36.0% 
CAR [+3;+130] 25 -8.08% -8.59% -2.685 0.006 24.0% 
Panel B: Associations of institutional investors 
Event window [days] N Mean Median t stat p value % positive 
CAR [-10;-3] 12 -2.25% -1.88% -1.293 0.111 33.3% 
CAR [-2;+2] 12 0.93% 1.40% 1.001 0.169 58.3% 
CAR [+3;+20] 12 -0.12% -2.70% -0.061 0.476 41.7% 
CAR [+3;+130] 11 0.50% 3.33% 0.105 0.459 54.5% 
Panel C: Hedge funds 
Event window [days] N Mean Median t stat p value % positive 
CAR [-10;-3] 17 -1.03% -1.73% -0.435 0.335 35.3% 
CAR [-2;+2] 17 3.10% 0.30% 1.555 0.070 58.8% 
CAR [+3;+20] 17 0.48% 1.50% 0.260 0.399 52.9% 
CAR [+3;+130] 16 -4.84% -0.55% -0.857 0.202 43.8% 
Panel D: Investment managers 
Event window [days] N Mean Median t stat p value % positive 
CAR [-10;-3] 21 -4.67% -3.01% -1.544 0.069 42.9% 
CAR [-2;+2] 21 0.55% 1.26% 0.374 0.356 66.7% 
CAR [+3;+20] 21 -0.63% 0.45% -0.250 0.403 52.4% 
CAR [+3;+130] 19 3.88% 5.89% 0.524 0.303 57.9% 
Note: The total count of the events in the table does not sum up to 101 because only events with 
single demand were taken into account. 
 
 
 
